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Patricia White recently asked a simple question: What is the value of
systemic coherence, or rationality, in tax legislationT This is asked along the
way of an errand that does not require its answer,' but White supposes, in
passing, that the value queried is relative: no doubt systemic coherence is
desirable, but it may conflict with other values predicable of a tax system,
values it cannot invariably trump.3 This entails, on the one hand, that norma-
tive claims for rationality in this sphere regularly imply assignments of
weights,4 and, on the other hand, that systemic coherence ought to be irresist-
ible whenever it can be achieved without prejudice to competing values-
whenever, that is, other things may be said to be equal.
The Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "IRC" or the "Code") displays
cases of the latter description in which Congress has, nevertheless, contrived
to resist rationality's appeal. These represent a highly refined strain of inco-
herence in the Code. In each of them, coherence could have been achieved
without prejudice to any systemic value with which it might otherwise com-
pete. These are not cases in which rationality has been sacrificed for the sake
of simplicity, administrative convenience, taxpayer-morale, or any other
colorable desideratum. They are cases in which the onlyprincipled purchase
of incoherence is incoherence. Yet they are evidently not inadvertent: at
places in which Congress might easily have stumbled on coherence, it has
drawn itself up, and gone carefully around.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy. A.B., University of Michigan,
1979: J.D., University of Detroit, 1984; LL.M. (in Taxation), New York University, 1985.
The author wishes to thank Elina Beim and Nancy Itnyre for research assistance.
1. Patricia D. White, Realization, Recognition, Reconciliation, Rationality and the Structure
of the Federal Income Tax System, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2034, 2037-38 (1990).
2. White's concern is to specify certain structural features without which a system of rules
could not be recognized as an income tax system. Id. at 2038. No doubt some coherence is a
necessary feature of anything that can be recognized as a system, but White's interest is in the
conditions of minimum suitability for the special purposes of taxation. Beyond the threshold
necessary for a set of rules to count as a system at all, White regards systemic coherence as a
contingent feature. Id. at 2038, 2088-89.
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Such 'refinement' suggests analogies to the kind of irrationality dis-
played by decision makers whose preferences violate the standard axioms of
decision theory.5 The goal of this article is to explore one such analogy. It will
be argued here that certain provisions of the Code-we shall focus on section
642(g) 6 for illustration-are analogous to violations of what decision theorists
sometimes call a "sure thing principle..' The analogy yields both a precise
account of what evidently goes wrong in these provisions, and a straightfor-
ward general characterization of the sense in which they are irrational. The
Code's treatment of an item is irrational in this sense if it would be possible
to make a book against someone having the same pattern of preferences (for
the treatment of that item) in such a way that she would lose out, by her own
standards, no matter what happened.8 On this conception, tax rationality is a
kind of formal coherence.9 It has nothing to say about the ends Congress
pursues through taxation;"° it requires only that a tax scheme be suited to those
ends (whatever they are) so as to promote, rather than frustrate, their achieve-
ment.
We can invoke the straightforwardness of this conception of irrational-
ity without trying to model the circumstances in which Congress is liable to
be swindled. It suggests the value of systemic coherence is partly the value
of voluntary compliance which makes an easy start to an answer to White's
question. If one's preferences are irrational in the sense described, one's
attempts to effect them are liable to be self-frustrating. To the extent a sys-
tem of commands is self-frustrating from the point of view of the issuer it
undermines respect for, or goodwill towards, the issuer as a motivation for
compliance. Someone who understands the commands to be incoherent in this
sense may have reason to comply-she may wish to avoid sanctions noncom-
5. This kind of irrationality is sometimes called "instrumental." See, e.g., ALLAN GIBBARD,
WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 10 (1990); David Gauthier, On the Refutation of Utilitarianism,
in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 144, 146 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds.,
1982). It concerns the means chosen to achieve given ends. GIBBARD, supra; JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14 (1972).
6. I.R.C. § 642(g) (West 1995). Section 642(g) forces the executrix of a decedent's estate
to an election for the deduction of certain expenses that would otherwise be deductible against
both the income and estate tax bases. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8. This is the sense of irrationality to which decision theorists appeal. "The claim that a
rational pattern of preferences is rational may be justified in this sense: if someone has a set
of preferences that is not rational, it is possible to make book against him in such a way that
whatever happens he will lose out by his own standards." DONALD DAVIDSON, Hemple on
Explaining Action, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 261, 268 (1980). See also GIBBARD,
supra note 5, at 286; F.P. Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 52, 78
(D.H. Mellor ed., 1990).
9. See GIBBARD, supra note 5, at 13 (characterizing the upshot of the standard
axiomizations of decision theory as "a kind of formal coherence").
10. See supra note 5.
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pliance will trigger or think that the benefits of automatic respect for the
issuer's commands outweigh those to be obtained by insisting the issuer make
sense. However, she cannot be motivated by a desire to achieve the issuer's
immediate ends, for the issuer is evidently of two minds (at least) as to what
its immediate ends should be.
Of course, this is only part of the answer. The value of rationality is no
doubt complex. At one extreme, surely, it is aesthetic: other things being
equal, there is no reason why the Code should be ugly." At the other extreme,
a modicum of systemic coherence is a practical necessity even assuming
voluntary compliance, for some degree of coherence is needed for interpre-
tation, 2 and we expect tax legislation will have to be interpreted regularly to
be applied.'3 Between these extremes lies a vast range of concerns (includ-
ing, presumably, Congressional determination not to be swindled). Systemic
coherence must have a lot to do, for instance, with our attempts both to be fair
in determining what to consider as like cases 4 and to be prudent in respect-
ing the nontax incentives with which we tamper. 5
11. The relevant sense of 'ugliness' must be something like the mathematician's when she
says, for instance, "[b]eauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly
mathematics." G.H. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN'S APOLOGY 84-85 (4th prtg. 1969).
12. This idea is standard among contemporary philosophers. See Donald Davidson, Judging
Interpersonal Interests, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 195, 206 (Jon Elster &
Aanund Hylland eds., 1986). It is frequently discussed in terms of "principles of charity."
See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 58-59 (1960); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 53 (1986). In a discussion of conscious motivations, Donald Davidson puts
the matter this way:
If we are to understand any of these ["human thoughts, speech, intentions,
motives, and actions"], make sense of them as thoughts and speech and
actions, we must find a way to read into them a pattern subject to complex
constraints. Some of these constraints are logical, and some are causal
.... People are in general right about the mental causes of their emotions,
intentions, and actions because as interpreters we interpret them so as to
make them so. We must, if we are to interpret at all.
DONALD DAVIDSON, Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS,
supra note 8, at 277, 290. The same idea is widely known (by the same name) as a convention
of textual interpretation. See GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES, IRONIST AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHER 236 (1991).
13. This has implications at various levels of administration. To the extent, for instance,
that taxpayers and their advisors can fairly be relegated to their wits, authorities charged with
administration may fairly eschew opportunities to pronounce on the treatment of particular
cases.
14. The necessity of criteria for determining what count as like cases for a particular purpose
is arguably fundamental to the concept of law. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 623-24 (1958), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49 (1983), and in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 17 (R.M.
Dworkin ed., 1977).
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Still, this part of the answer is important. It is important practically
because voluntary compliance is a necessity of such weight that practically
anything undermining it is significant. 6 (Thus, for instance, utilitarian argu-
ments for energetic enforcement adduce not the net amounts to be wrested
from scofflaws, but the margin of compliance to be secured by deterrence. 7 )
This part of the answer is important analytically because it is uniquely impli-
cated by the limiting case, the case in which other systemic values may be said
to be equal. In other cases, as noted, normative claims for rationality will
involve assignments of weights, 8 and these assignments are bound to be
controversial. A taxpayer may reasonably disagree with them without ex-
hausting her own goodwill towards the legislature (or the legislative process,
or the communities it represents, etc.) as a motivation for compliance. In the
cases we have in view, however, such accommodations are unavailable.
II. THE SURE-THING PRINCIPLE
Overt inconsistencies in the Code need not detain us. To the extent such
inconsistencies result from competition among legitimate policy goals,' 9 they
lack the sort of 'refinement' we want. To the extent they result merely from
legislative inadvertence2 ° (or even from expediency), they are sufficiently
condemned on the ground that (other things being equal) the Code should not
be ugly. We are interested in a subtler form of irrationality, one that bears
marks of deliberation, and which (perhaps sometimes for that reason) may be
relatively difficult to detect. We will, however, begin with an example that
seems to be glaring, and, for that purpose, we stray briefly from the Code.
Suppose a person X is shopping for a translation of the Aeneid. X tells
a clerk in a book store "I prefer the translation by C. Day Lewis [a]; if you
haven't got that, I'll take the one by F.W. Jackson Knight [b]; but I don't want
the translation by Allen Mandelbaum [c]." The clerk says "I've got [a] and
[b], but not [c]." To which X replies "All right, I'll take [b]." The clerk goes
off (scratching her head). Presently she reappears saying "I'm sorry-I was
Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604 (1964).
16. See Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals and Legitimacy, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 569
(1994).
17. See Walter T. Henderson, Jr., Criminal Liability under the Internal Revenue Code: A
Proposal to Make the "Voluntary" Compliance System a Little Less "Voluntary", 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1992).
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication,
45 TAX L. REV. 25, 52-54 (1989).
20. See Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the
Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 673, 686-89 (1969).
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wrong: I've got [a], but I haven't got either [b] or [c]." "In that case," X says
"I'll wait."
Strange goings on! Of course, we can imagine attitudes towards the
prospects involved that would make sense of X's preferences. It might be, for
instance, that, other things being equal, X prefers [b] to [a], but that X is also
concerned (for some reason) that [a] should show well against [c] in a mar-
keting survey that X knows is being conducted currently, and which, to X's
knowledge, will not register a purchase of one book as a preference over the
other unless, at the time of the purchase, the store in which the purchase
occurs has copies of both books available for sale. But suppose there is no
such rationale for X's behavior; suppose her motivation throughout is merely
a desire to own a copy of the translation she judges to be the best (in some
sense) among those with which she is familiar. In that case, X's behavior is
certainly strange, but is it irrational?
We can rule out logical incoherence. One might think X's saying "if you
haven't got [a], I'll take [b]" (call this statement $,) logically implies 'if you
have got [a],I won't take [b]-I'll take [a]' (call this statement S2). But that
is an instance of the "fallacy of denying the antecedent," 21 which is to say that
S2 cannot be validly deduced from the conjunction of S, and the statement
'You have got [a].' 22
On the other hand, the hypothetical itself suggests that logical consis-
tency is not sufficient for rationality, and indeed, the philosophers, econo-
mists, and decision theorists who model rational choice under uncertainty23
do not suppose that it is. They represent rationality as a decision procedure
(known as the Bayesian decision rule 24 ) that can be derived mathematically
from "axioms," that is, from extralogical contingencies we are more or less
readily prepared to accept as characterizations of rational decision making.
In addition to logical consistency, the standard axiomizations require that a
21. See RICHARD JEFFREY, FORMAL LOGIC, ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 65-66 (2d ed. 1981).
22. See id. at 3-10, 59-62, 66.
23. 1. e., between uncertain outcomes.
24. After the 18th-century English mathematician T. Bayes. See HERMAN CHERNOFF &
LINCOLN E. MOSES, ELEMENTARY DECISION THEORY 136 (Dover Publications 1986) (1959).
25. See LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 21 (2d rev. ed. 1972);
Gauthier, supra note 5, at 146; John C. Harsanyi, Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do
Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?, 6 THEORY AND
DECISION 311, 311-12 (1975), reprinted in JOHN C. HARSANYI, ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 64, 64-65 (1976); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and
the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 SOC. RES. 625, 628-29, 636-37 (1977), reprinted in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 43, 48-49 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
See generally Peter Girdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin, Introduction: Bayesian Decision Theory-
Foundations and Problems, in DECISION, PROBABILITY, AND UTILITY, 1, 2-8 (Peter Gardenfors
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decision maker's preferences form an ordering,2 6 and what is sometimes
called a "sure-thing principle,"" according to which if o, 02, and 03 are out-
comes the decision maker cares about, andp is some prospect (an outcome or
an independent event) about which she cares not at all, then if she prefers o
to 02, she prefers the compound prospect
o, if p, otherwise 03
to the compound prospect
02 if p, otherwise 03.28
Assuming the absence of any covert rationale,29 X's preferences in the
Aeneid hypothetical clearly violate the sure-thing principle. Given (i) the
outcomes
ol: X gets [a],
02: X gets [b],
03: X waits,
(ii) that X prefers ol to 02, and (iii) that she has no wish to acquire [c] at all, the
principle dictates that she should prefer the compound prospect
o, if the store has no copies of[c], otherwise 03
to the compound prospect
26. See SAVAGE, supra note 25. This condition is sometimes characterized by saying that
"preferability is a transitive asymmetrical relation." RAMSEY, supra note 8, at 78. Talk
about the "transitivity," "asymmetry," and "ordering" of preferences is by way of informal
description. These are merely (more or less convenient) names for results formally entailed
by "axioms." We can afford to speak loosely of the axioms. The points to be made here do
not depend on specific formulations.
27. SAVAGE, supra note 25, at 21-26. See generally GIBBARD, supra note 5, at 13;
Gdrdenfors & Sahlin, supra note 25, at 8. A similar, though stronger, principal is widely
referred to in the literature as "the independence axiom." See, e.g., Paul Samuelson,
Probability, Utility and the Independence Axiom, 20 ECONOMETRICIA 670 (1952); Mark
Machina, Generalized Expected Utility Analysis and the Nature of Observed Violations of the
Independence Axiom, in FOUNDATIONS OF UTILITY AND RISK THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS
263 (B.P. Stigum & F. Wenstop eds., 1983), reprinted in DECISION, PROBABILITY, AND
UTILITY, supra note 25, at 215. Social choice theorists-who study preference-aggregation
devices such as voting schemes-employ a similar rationality constraint which they refer to
as "the independence of irrelevant alternatives." See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 26-28 (2d ed. 1963).
28. This is a loose formulation of the principle based on GIBBARD, supra note 5, at 13. See
also supra note 26.
29. See supra p. 5.
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02 if the store has no copies of[c], otherwise 03.
But X prefers the reverse.30
Again, the principle is not a logical constraint.3' There is room for de-
bate about whether a preference scheme that violates it is irrational just for
that reason.32 And the principle is in fact debated. 33 There are settings in
which it seems to hinder a decision theory descriptively, 34 and settings in
which it seems to hinder normatively.35 But these debates lack motivation
here. X's behavior seems to be irrational in an obvious sense (namely that,
assuming she means what she says throughout, her behavior is self-defeat-
ing 36), and the sure-thing principle seems to give an exact account of what
goes wrong. In the Aeneid hypothetical, at least, the principle seems to be
irresistible as a way of thinking practically,37 and ultimately, attractiveness as
a way of thinking practically may be the only test we have for a normative
principle. 38
30. For a similarly homely illustration of the sure-thing principle (involving the irrelevance
of a presidential election) see SAVAGE, supra note 25, at 21.
31. See supra notes 21-22, 25-27 and accompanying text.
32. See G~irdenfors & Sahlin, supra note 25, at 11-13.
33. Id. at 8.
34. In these settings the principle requires people to do something they are not actually
inclined to do in circumstances in which they would be well advised to do what the principle
requires. A problem known as "Allais' paradox" (after the French economist Maurice Allais)
is a widely discussed setting of this kind. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265 (1979), reprinted
in DECISION, PROBABILITY, AND UTILITY, supra note 25, at 183, 186; SAVAGE, supra note 25,
at 101-103. It suggests the sure-thing principle hinders a decision theory descriptively, but it
seems also to suggest the irrationality of the behavior it fails to predict. SAVAGE, supra note
25, at 103.
35. A well-known example of this kind is the "Prisoner's Dilemma," a standard "game"
(attributed to the mathematician A.W. Tucker) used by decision theorists to characterize
situations in which self-interest leads "players" to take mutually disadvantageous decisions.
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 452 (4th ed. 1977);
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-95 (Dover Publications
1989) (1957). Self-interest is the widely known interpretation on which the game yields
suboptimal results, but it is not the only such interpretation. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 82 n.22 (1987). The Dilemma's description of behavior in the situations it
characterizes is widely supposed to be accurate. See, e.g., BAUMOL, supra (the Dilemma
"shows why citizens may not contribute taxes voluntarily even though each wants the
government to function," why "storekeepers will keep their shops open on Sunday although
they all prefer a holiday," etc.). In this context, debate over the sure-thing principle focuses
on its normative force. See ANATOL RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES 174-77 (1960);
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 91-92 (1984). Interpreted normatively, the principle
advises people to do what they are actually inclined to do in circumstances in which they
would be well advised to do otherwise.
36. This is the sense of irrationality to which decision theorists appeal. See supra note 8.
37. Irresistible, that is, as a way of thinking about how someone in X's situation should
behave.
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In any case, we can sympathize with X's friend Y who, let us say, inter-
venes on X's behalf, or, rather, tries to. Before X has been to the book store,
Y, who happens to be going there directly, offers to saveX the trip. "I'm going
there now," she says. "Just tell me what you want." Whereupon X describes
the same pattern of preferences described above: "I prefer [a]" she says. "If
either they haven't got [a], or they haven't got [c], I'll take [b]; but I don't
want [c]." Y, wondering if she can have heard this right, says "Am I to under-
stand that if they've got [a] and [b], but not [c], you want [b]?" "That's right"
X says. "What if they've got [a], but they haven't got either [b] or [c]?" "In
that case," X says "I'll wait." Y then asks whether there is any reason the
store's not having [c] should either increase the value of [b] to X or diminish
that of [a], to which X replies (with an expression of puzzlement almost as
extreme as Y's own) "Not at all!" At this point, thinking it best not to pursue
the matter, Y goes off hoping for X's sake that the store will have copies of
both [a] and [c]. But (of course) she hopes in vain, 'I've got [a] and [b]," says
the store clerk, "but not [c]."
Y's problem, if she has one, is only that she wishes X well. (For the
moment, we can ignore the possibility that Y intends to make X a present of
the book, and, therefore, the possibility of a price differential that Y thinks
significant. 39) If Y does not care whether X gets the book X really wants, then
she can do as X has instructed her to do in these circumstances (buy a copy of
[b]), and be done with it. But to the extent Y's concern is X's best interest, she
must be tempted to ignore X's instruction, buy X a copy of [a], and keep mum
about the store's not having a copy of [c]. For as the sure thing principle
suggests,4" the likeliest diagnosis of X's trouble in this case is a failure to
appreciate the independence of an irrelevant alternative, namely the possibil-
ity of buying a copy of [c]. Y is likely to think X does indeed prefer [a] to [b],
but that she has somehow overlooked the practical implications of that pref-
erence for a certain case involving [c].
At any rate, if Ydecides to follow X's instruction (because, for instance,
she fears that otherwise X may learn of her officiousness and be angry), it
cannot be because, out of regard for X, Y wishes to achieve X's immediate
ends. From Y's point of view, X is evidently of two minds as to what her
[iun general, a person who has tentatively accepted a normative theory must
conscientiously study situations in which the theory seems to lead him astray; he must
decide for each by reflection-deduction will typically be of little relevance-whether
to retain his initial impression of the situation or to accept the implications of the
theory for it.
SAVAGE, supra note 25, at 102.
39. These possibilities are taken up infra note 83 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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immediate ends should be. Herinstructions are incoherent-not logically, but
practically-in a way that forces Yto conclude that eitherX is confused about
what it is she really wants, or she has a conception of practical reason so radi-
cally different form Y's own as to be incomprehensible to Y. Either conclu-
sion vitiates Y's goodwill towards X as a motivation for following the instruc-
tions.
III. CHIMERICAL DOUBLE DEDUCTIONS
The point is that there are instances in which the Code expresses a pat-
tern of preferences (for the treatment of some item of tax significance) that
seems to be incoherent or irrational in exactly the way X's preferences are.
With respect to those instances, the well-disposed taxpayer is in a position
very like Y's. One example (the one we shall focus onfor illustration) is IRC
section 64 2 (g), 41 which forces the executrix of a decedent's estate to an elec-
tion for the deduction of certain expenses that would otherwise be deductible
in the computation of both the decedent's taxable estate and the estate's tax-
able income. 42
Amounts allowable under section 2053 or 2054 as a deduction in comput-
ing the taxable estate of a decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction
... in computing the taxable income of the estate•., unless there is filed,
•.. a waiver of the right to have such amounts allowed at any time as
deductions under section 2053 or 2054 .... 41
A decedent's estate is treated as a separate taxpayer for federal income
tax purposes 44 and the taxable income of an estate is determined, for the most
part, under the rules applied in determining the taxable income of an indi-
vidual.4 5 In many cases, items deductible in the computation of the taxable
estate under IRC sections 205346 and 205441 will also be deductible in the
computation of the estate's taxable income. Administration expenses, for
example, may be deductible under IRC section 21248 as well as section 2053;
41. I.R.C. § 642(g) (West 1995).
42. See generally 3 BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 81.2.6, at 81-25 (1981); M. CARR FERGUSON ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND BENEFICIARIES § 4.2.6, at 4:23 (2d. ed. 1995).
43. I.R.C. § 64 2 (g) (West 1995). The'election may be selective. Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2(West 1995); BITTKER, supra note 42; FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 42, § 4.2.6, at 4:23-24.
44. I.R.C. § 641(a) (West 1995).
45. Id. § 641(b).
46. I.R.C. § 2053 allows a deduction in the computation of a decedent's taxable estate for
claims and administrative expenses paid by the decedent's executrix. Id. § 2053.
47. I.R.C. § 2054 allows an estate tax deduction for casualty losses sustained during the
period of administration. To the extent such losses are not compensated by insurance, they
can be deducted in computing the decedent's taxable estate. Id. §,2054.
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and an uncompensated casualty loss suffered by an estate may be deductible
under IRC section 16549 as well as section 2054. Under the caption "Disal-
lowance of double deductions,"50 section 642(g) withdraws roughly half of the
combined generosity of these provisions. It requires the affected deductions
to be taken against one or the other of the relevant tax bases. But it is hard to
see why this should be.5'
Suppose an individual Z owns investments in respect of which she incurs
expenses, say $100, for investment advice, clerical assistance and safe-deposit
rentals. She pays the expenses in the taxable year in which she incurs them,
and dies on the first day of the following taxable year. In that case, the ex-
penses yield Z a $100 deduction, under section 2 12,52 on her penultimate in-
come tax return, and her "gross estate" for federal estate tax purposes will not
include $100 of value attributable to the deductible expenses.53 In these cir-
cumstances, an.expense described in section 212 is allowed as an income tax
deduction even though it reduces the value of the payor' s estate for transfer
tax purposes.54 But the same treatment is not permitted if the expense is in-
curred after the date of Z's death. In that case, section 642(g) will allow the
expense to reduce either Z's taxable estate or her estate's taxable income, but
not both.55
Section 642(g)'s discrimination here is arbitrary. Congress evidently
regards the income and estate tax bases as separate-it subjects them to sepa-
rate rate schedules.5 6 Its reasons (whatever they are) for allowing a deduction
against one of the bases must be independent of those for allowing it against
the other, otherwise the notion that the different taxes tax different things is
inexplicable. The question in each case is presumably just what is it that
Congress wishes to subject to the relevant rate schedule.57 And this is true
even if one of the taxes is viewed as an adjunct to the other.58 In that case, the
idea must be that the success of Congress's attempts to tax one thing depend
49. Id.§ 165.
50. Id. § 642(g).
51. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 42.
52. See I.R.C. § 212(1)-(2) (West 1995).
53. See id. § 2031(a) (defining the "gross estate" as the value, as of the decedent's death,
of all property described in I.R.C. §§ 2033-2046, which sections compose the statutory
definition of the estate tax base). See generally RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 4.02[11]-[2] (6th ed. 1991).
54. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 42, § 4.2.6, at 4:24.
55. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
56. I.R.C. §§ 1, 2001 (West 1995).
57. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 42, § 4.2.6, at 4:24.
58. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J.
259, 270-73 (1983) (suggesting a justification for the federal estate tax based on its ensuring
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on its taxing another,5 9 for (again) Congress has eschewed a unified federal
tax base. 60 To the extent of the deductions allowed in the computation of the
taxable estate, 61 the estate tax is intended to be a tax on the net amount distrib-
utable to those persons entitled to take the decedent's property.62 To the extent
of the deductions allowed in the computation of taxable income, the income
tax is intended to be a tax on net income rather than gross. 63
Clearly, though, an expense described in section 2053 reduces the
amount distributable to those entitled to take the decedent's property regard-
less of whether that expense is deducted in the computation of the estate's tax-
able income. Likewise, an expense described in section 212 reduces the
amount of net accounting income regardless of whether that expense is de-
ducted against the decedent's estate tax base. Whether it is a good idea to
allow a given expense or loss to be deducted for one of these purposes has, in
principle, nothing to do with whether it is a good idea to allow that expense
or loss to be deducted for the other purpose. Apparently, Congress has de-
cided that both section 212 and section 2053 (and that both section 165 and
section 2054) are good ideas. If the rationale for disallowing "double deduc-
tions" is supposed to be simply that the same expense ought not to be deducted
twice,64 it is plausible assuming one is talking about a single tax base. But the
deductions disallowed by section 642(g) are not "double" in that sense. They
are "double" only because Congress has accepted reasons for allowing them
against each of two distinct tax bases, and this can hardly be grounds for dis-
allowing them.
Section 64 2(g) itself suggests that Congress must have been aware of the
section's incoherence. The last sentence of the section says "This subsection
shall not apply with respect to deductions allowed under [section 69 165]. ' 66
IRC section 691 provides a solution to an accounting problem. But for that
the progressivity aimed at by the income tax).
59. The estate tax, for instance, may be viewed as being dependent in this way on a gift
tax. See Joseph Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Transfers, and the
Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61. I.R.C. § 2051 defines the "taxable estate" as the value of the "gross estate" minus the
deductions provided in part IV of chapter 1 A of the Code, namely §§ 2053-2056A. I.R.C. §
2051 (West 1995).
62. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 53, 5.03, at 5-4.
63. See generally 1 BIrTKER, supra note 42, 2.1.1.
64. For a flat-footed acceptance of this rationale, see Patricia Ann Metzer, The Deduction
of an Estate's Administration Expenses: Section 642(g) of the Internal Revenue Code and Its
Impact, 21 TAX L. REV. 459, 462-63 (1966).
65. I.R.C. § 691 (West 1995).
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section, the rule that an individual's final taxable year terminates on the date
of her death 67 would cause symmetrical inequalities with respect to "cash
basis" taxpayers and amounts receivable but not received prior to death on the
one hand, and "accrual method" taxpayers and expenses payable but not paid
prior to death on the other.68 On the expenses side, the problem is that an
accrual method taxpayer would be entitled to deduct on her final return a
deductible expense payable in her final taxable year notwithstanding that the
expense might actually be paid by her executrix, in which case the expense
would be deductible in the computation of the estate tax. 69 But a cash basis
taxpayer under these circumstances would not be allowed to deduct the ex-
pense on her final return, and since there is no income tax deduction for claims
against a decedent's estate, the payment by the executrix will give rise to an
estate tax deduction only.
Congress had two alternatives when it decided to equalize the treatment
of accrual method and cash basis taxpayers regarding expenses incurred but
not paid prior to death. It could either deny the accrual method taxpayer one
of the two deductions available to her in the relevant case, or make another
deduction available to the cash basis taxpayer. It chose to do the latter.7 °
Section 691 (b) grants the estate of a decedent who reported her income on the
cash basis an income tax deduction for expenses incurred by the decedent but
not paid prior to her death. And, of course, the punch line is that the deduc-
tions referred to in the last sentence of section 642(g)7' are the very ones
described in section 691 (b). The latter section was enacted precisely because
Congress thought it appropriate to allow an income tax deduction for expenses
paid by an estate that would otherwise be deductible only against the estate tax
base. Congress went out of its way, so to speak, to allow "double deductions"
in cases in which, depending on the taxpayer's method of accounting, they
might have been unavailable. By enacting section 642(g), Congress went out
of its way again, this time to deny "double deductions" in cases in which they
would otherwise have been available without regard to section 691 (b), and yet
it chose to let the rule of section 691(b) stand.
67. Id. § 443(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a)(2).
68. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 42, § 4.3.1, at 2:30.
69. See supra note 46.
70. See I.R.C. § 691(b) (West 1995).
71. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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This is perhaps as strong an antimony as one can find in the Code, and
it represents a rare instance in which the usually antithetical goals of fairness
and simplicity could both be advanced by a single legislative act, namely the
repeal of section 642(g). What is more important for our purposes, though,
is that the pattern of preferences for the treatment of deductible expenses
effected by section 642(g) bears a strong resemblance to that of X's prefer-
ences in our Aeneid hypothetical.7 2 We may think of the prospects as follows.
P,: The estate tax base is reduced by [a given] expense or loss.
P2: The income tax base is reduced by the expense or loss.
With respect to any given expense or loss, Congress's principled reasons for
preferring P, to -P 173 (or vice versa) must be independent of those for prefer-
ring P2 to -P 2 (or vice versa).7 4 Thus in a given case, Congress ought to pre-
fer P, to -PI (if it does) regardless of whether P2 or -P 2 obtains (and vice
versa). The preference (expressed in section 642(g)) for the prospect P if-P 2,
otherwise -P, is as irrational as X's preference in the Aeneid hypothetical for
the prospect [a] if the store has a copy of[c], otherwise [b]. 7 s And both seem
to be irrational for the same reason: the independent alternative P2 ought to be
as irrelevant to Congress's choice between P, and -P1, as the independent
possibility of buying a copy of [c] should be to X's choice between [a] and [b].
Of course, we can imagine attitudes towards the pairwise alternatives P1,
-P, and P 2, -P 2 on which they would draw linked preferences (just as we can
imagine rational motivations for X's behavior in the Aeneid hypothetical7 6).
The most plausible such attitude for the actual case (the case in which Con-
gress enacts section 642(g)) is a concern for revenue.7 7 But it has to be a
marginal concern. The problem with section 642(g) (if there is one) is not that
it denies deductions, 8 but that it denies deductions which are indistinguish-
able, from Congress's point of view, from deductions that Congress evidently
wants to allow. The possibility worth considering, then, is that Congress
72. See supra Part II of text.
73. I.e., the prospect that the estate tax base is not reduced by [a given] expense or loss.
74. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
76. See supra Part II of text.
77. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 42, § 4.2.6. at 4:24-:25.
78. Again, we conceive systemic rationality as a kind of formal coherence requiring only
that the tax scheme be suited to whatever ends Congress pursues through taxation so as to
promote, rather than frustrate, the achievement of those ends. See supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text. There is no reason why a tax scheme that involved no deductions could
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thinks there are good reasons for allowing certain deductions against the in-
come tax base, and equally good reasons for allowing the same deductions
against the estate tax base but that at the point located by section 642(g),
concern for revenue offsets approximately half of the combined weight of
these reasons, leaving Congress with a motivation to allow the deductions
against one or the other of the relevant bases, but not both.
This story is intelligible, but it is hardly mitigating. Even if there were
anything precise in this respect about section 642(g), even if it could be shown
that the marginal cost of allowing the so-called "double deductions" is crucial,
the idea that we should therefore deny the "double deductions" is too facile
to credit. Viewed as a response to marginal revenue loss, section 642(g) is
completely arbitrary. Congress might as well have secured the margin by
denying all deductions to estates of decedents who were (at some time in their
lives) over six feet tall, or whose surnames begin with letters falling in the
latter half of the alphabet. Again, the claim that the same expense ought not
to be deducted twice makes sense only if one is talking about a single tax base,
otherwise it is a meaningless slogan. 79 For the purpose of deciding who should
shore up a given margin of internal revenue, an estate's having an expense that
Congress thinks it has good reasons for allowing to reduce each of two differ-
ent tax bases is as arbitrary a feature of the case as is the letter with which the
decedent's surname begins.
Thus, someone who understands section 642(g), and suspects it was
enacted out of a concern for revenue, has to conclude that either Congress was
deluded by its own slogan, or the slogan was merely a pretext for gouging the
citizenry. The latter conclusion brings its own incentives for noncompli-
ance,80 and we can ignore them-they have nothing in particular to do with the
idea that section 64 2 (g) expresses an irrational set of preferences. The former
conclusion (that Congress was deluded by its own slogan) is relevant to the
incoherence we have in view, but only in that it suggests a causal account. It
suggests Congress may have failed to appreciate the independence of the
pairwise alternatives P,, -P, and P2, -P 28 1 because some of its members failed
to notice that the attraction of the idea that the same expense ought not to be
deducted twice depends on the assumption that one is thinking of a single tax
base.
With or without such a causal account, the well-disposed taxpayer con-
templating the application of section 642(g) (either to an estate of which she
is an executrix, or to her own prospective estate) is in a position very like Y's
79. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
80. See Martinez, supra note 16, at 543-44.
81. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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in our Aeneid hypothetical, 82 with the difference that the taxpayer's own eco-
nomic interests (or those of people to whom she owes at least a fiduciary
obligation) are at stake. (The cases are brought closer together in this respect
by the possibility, mentioned briefly above, 3 that, in the Aeneid hypothetical,
Y intends to make X a present of the book involved, and that [b] is consider-
ably more expensive than [a].) This means the taxpayer has an added moti-
vation not simply to do as Congress has instructed her to do in the relevant
circumstances (effect the mandated election, or-with respect to her own
prospective estate-leave no instructions suggesting a contrary intention).
But to the extent the taxpayer wants to do what Congress wants (out of regard
for Congress, or the legislative process, etc.), she must be tempted to thwart
the express intention of section 642(g).84 For, again, the likeliest diagnosis of
Congress's problem here is a failure to appreciate the independence of an
irrelevant alternative. Unless the taxpayer believes section 642(g) is merely
an attempt to gouge the citizenry,8" she is likely to think that, with respect to
the items affected, Congress does indeed prefer P, to -P, 8 6 (and P 2 to -P 287 ),
but that it has somehow overlooked the practical implications of that prefer-
ence for a certain case involving P 2 (or P,).
In any case, if the taxpayer does not believe section 642 (g) is an attempt
to gouge the citizenry, and she decides not to thwart (or to encourage the
thwarting of) its express intention, it cannot be because she wishes to achieve
Congress's immediate ends. From the point of view of someone who under-
stands section 642(g), its principled concerns are the respective descriptions
of the income and estate tax bases, and its testimony is that Congress is of two
minds as to what those descriptions should be.
82. See supra Part II of text.
83. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
84. The government is notoriously liable to be whipsawed in situations in which it is possible
to file the requisite waiver of estate tax deductions, see supra note 43 and accompanying text,
or amended income tax returns after the statute of limitations for the estate tax has expired.
See JEFFREY N. PENNELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS,
ESTATES, GRANTORS AND BENEFICIARIES 29-30 (1987). A taxpayer prepared to ignore other
provisions of the Code (in order to thwart section 642(g)) could proceed less elaborately.
She might, for instance, simply take the affected deductions against the income tax base, and
understate the value of properties includible in the gross estate by amounts equal, in the
aggregate, to the aggregate amount of the denied estate tax deductions. See supra note 53.
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86. I.R.C. §§ 2035, 2054 (West 1995). See supra notes 46-47.
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 642(g) is only one example of its kind. There are other instances
in which the Code suggests analogies to violations of the sure-thing principle,
or of other formal, nonlogical, principles of practical reason, 8  analogies, that
is, to the kind of irrationality displayed by decision makers whose preferences
violate the standard axioms.8 9 IRC section 2001(e) 90 is an example from the
estate tax. It prevents the half of the gift tax value of certain property trans-
ferred by the decedent's spouse that was electively treated for gift tax pur-
poses as having been transferred by the decedent 9' from being counted twice
in determining marginal estate tax rates-once in the decedent's estate and
once in the estate of the decedent's spouse. The odd thing is that the section
has that effect only in the narrow circumstance that the 'split gift' occurred
within three years of the decedent's spouse's death. 92 Otherwise, half of the
gift tax value of a split gift is counted twice in the way just described when-
ever the property subject to the gift is included in the donor spouse's "gross
estate." 93 Yet there is evidently no distinction between gifts that trigger in-
clusion in the gross estate occurring within three years of the donor's death
on the one hand, and such gifts occurring more than three years before the
donor's death on the other that would provide a principled basis for penaliz-
ing an election to split gifts in the latter case, but not in the former.94
The Code's preferences for the treatment of split gifts can be shown to
be analogous to preferences that violate the sure-thing principle on an analysis
that is in many respects identical to the one applied above to section 642(g).
We need not work out the analogy here. The point is only that examples like
section 642(g) can be multiplied. (On reflection, the reader will no doubt find
she has favorite examples of her own.) What such examples show is a kind
of irrationality that is only slightly less striking than logical inconsistency.
For they show patterns of preferences that violate the standard axioms of
88. For example, the standard requirement that a decision maker's preferences form an
ordering. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
90. I.R.C. § 2001(e) (West 1995).
91. I.R.C. § 2513(a) provides that on the consent of both spouses a gift made by one
spouse to anyone other than her spouse will be treated, for purposes of chapter 12 of the Code
(the gift tax), as having been made one-half by her and one-half by her spouse. I.R.C. §
2513(a) (West 1995).
92. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(b)(l)(B), (e), 2035(a), (d)(2) (West 1995). See generally James P.
Spica, Federal Transfer Tax Treatment of Actuarial Appreciation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 123,
155-59 (1993).
93. This can happen under any of the various I.R.C. sections listed in I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2).
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2036 (West 1995) (concerning transfers subject to retained life interests).
94. Spica, supra note 92, at 158. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 53, 2.01 [1] n.14.
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decision theory, and someone in the grip of such preferences is liable to lose
out by her own standards, no matter what happens. 9
What we have argued here is that the price of such irrationality is not
primarily that Congress is liable to be swindled, but rather that it hobbles
goodwill towards Congress (or the legislative process, etc.) as a motivation
for compliance. Confronted with a provision like section 642(g) (or section
2001 (e)), the comprehending taxpayer has to conclude either that Congress is
surreptitiously and haphazardly pursuing objectives that could be achieved
forthrightly and systematically by raising marginal rates, or that it simply does
not know what it is that it hopes to achieve. In the latter case, the well-dis-
posed taxpayer's reasons for compliance cannot include a desire to achieve
Congress's objectives. By hypothesis, Congress is unable to say what its
objectives are. We have treated this as a local phenomenon, cropping up here
and there in the Code, neutralizing the taxpayer's goodwill as a motivation for
compliance with specific provisions. And that would be enough to condemn
it. But attitudes towards the Code as a whole surely affect taxpayers' dispo-
sitions, and to that extent, presumably, the idea that the Code is characteris-
tically irrational would be marginally demoralizing with respect even to pro-
visions that make sense. In some quantity, then, incoherence of the quality
examined here must pose a global threat of the kind we have noticed locally.
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